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This paper aims at showing marketing and organizational impacts of the diversification of 
distribution channels, i.e. interfaces between distributor and consumer, on the service encounter 
between customers and a service firm in retail banking. Interactions between branches, the outgoing 
call-centre and the incoming call-centre are scrutinized. Our study highlights four main results : (a) 
New distribution channels use is linked to customer profile, and lack of customer capacity to 
participate is a major restraint to customer willingness to participate. (b) New distribution channels 
favour potential customer opportunism for a limited number of customers. Two forms of opportunism 
are shown: active and premeditated opportunism versus the incoming call-centre, “spontaneous” or 
“incident” opportunism when called by the outgoing call-centre. (c) To limit potential opportunism, 
the bank insists on formal coordination mechanisms: process standardization, qualification 
standardization, direct supervision. (d) the customer acts as a “perception filter” between the different 
channels employees. The customer’s actions modify - positively or more generally negatively - the 
internal perception of branch sales people about their colleagues working in the call centre.  
 
Keywords : distribution channels ; multichannel distribution ; intra-organizational 
coordination ; opportunism ; retail banking sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing number of research  have underlined the impacts of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) on both firms strategies and organizations: development 
of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), changes in the relationships between a 
firm and its  stakeholders,  new communication and distribution media…  These 
transformations seem to affect the entire value chain. 
As far as we are concerned,  we decided to focus on the consequences  of the 
emergence of new distribution channels in service firms in a B-to-C context, thanks to the 
development of ICT. First, we find it necessary to specify how we define a “distribution 
channel” in this paper. A definition commonly admitted in marketing literature is “a set of 
interdependent institutions and agencies involved with the tasks of moving anything of value 
from its point of conception, extraction or production to the point of consumption” (Stern, El-
Ansary & Coughlan, 1996: 8). But a distribution channel may also be “the interface between a 
provider/distributor and a consumer” (Filser, 1989: 151), i.e. where the customer interacts 
with the service firm. This definition is the one that will be used thereafter. 
More exactly, we are going to focus on the service encounter, defined by Salomon et 
alii as “face-to-face interactions between a buyer and a seller in a service setting” (Solomon 
et alii, 1985: 100). This implies that this encounter is located at the distribution channel level. 
During this encounter, the customer does participate in the service, and may act as a co-
producer of the service (Eiglier & Langeard, 1977; Chase, 1978; Kelley, Donnelly & Skinner, 
1990). However, within our framework of the development of new distribution channels, i.e. 
new interfaces between a service firm and its customers, there are now multiple encounter 
points. More precisely, in order to get a service, a customer can use one channel or another. 
For example, to reserve a vacation, nowadays, a customer may either decide to go to a travel 
agency, phone a call-centre, use an internet site, or even use an interactive television program. 
Among  many  sectors, retail banking is widely impacted by these new distribution 
channels.  Indeed, beside the historical  and usual branches network,  a customer  can now 
access his bank through most sophisticated call-centres, mobile services, Internet Web sites, 
interactive television services… This is usually referred to as a “bricks and clicks” (Hensman 
& Van den Bosch, 2001), or a “clicks and mortar” strategy (Pottruck & Pierce, 2000). These 
transformations are profoundly changing the way  a consumer interacts with his bank, and 
raises many questions that  get on to  marketing and organizational consequences of the 
introduction and development of these new channels. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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So, based on literature and a case study, three research questions will guide our further 
developments. The first one deals with the characteristics of the customer (his/her profile) and 
the practical details of his participation in the service. The second one will focus on the risk of 
potential opportunism (as defined by Williamson) on behalf of the customer, opportunism that 
may result from the multiplication of distribution channels.  And finally,  we will try and 
identify how a multichannel distribution system is coordinated. 
LITERATURE REVIEW. 
The customer as a “partial employee” (Mills & Morris, 1986). 
Chase (1978) negatively linked efficiency and contact level between customers and 
service providers, contact being understood as physical presence. We can not help that this 
rather limited definition of “contact” has evolved, due to the emergence of new contact 
possibilities, and more precisely in our study with new distribution channels.  His first 
proposal was to reduce customer contact whenever possible, and develop technological 
answers. Then, in a 1983-article with Mills & Marguiles, it has been assumed that besides 
improving productivity by technological means, having the customer “induced to do more in 
the transaction” (: 302) could be useful. 
Therefore, to improve contact efficiency for the service firm, the emphasis has been 
set on customer role(s). Mills & Morris (1986) wrote a development about clients’ evolution 
as “partial employee” of a service firm. Customer participation was considered as a need and 
“(a)s  active participants, clients and customers must acquire the knowledge, skills and 
dispositions” to be able to perform properly. 
So, the customer can be considered as a factor of productivity improvement for the 
service firm, if his / her participation is facilitated by being properly addressed (Lovelock and 
Young, 1979), motivated (Mills,  Chase  &  Marguiles,  1983) or managed as a “ human 
resource” (Bowen, 1986). This interest has been strengthened, with the evolution of private 
individual customers, during the last thirty years, from  “passive audience” to  “active 
players” (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000). Bitner et al. (1997) stressed the importance of 
effective customer participation in quality evaluation of the service. Therefore, Customer 
Participation (CP) also deserves a broader interest. We can define CP in reference to “the 
actions and resources supplied by customers for service production and/or delivery” (Rush 
Rudie & Schultz Kleine, 2000).  
CP is linked to the customer ability and motivation (Bowen, 1986) or willingness 
(Rush Rudie & Schultz Kleine, 2000) to perform as expected. Customer ability to participate Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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depends on the customer resources to fit the required level of participation. These resources 
can be either physical, cognitive, or emotional. Customer willingness or  motivation to 
participate is function of his/her expectations about increased effectiveness, increased 
efficiency or psychological advantages due to his /her participation. Customer ability and 
motivation are to be studied within the frame of a given role size, (Rusch Rodie & Schultz 
Kleine, 2000) i.e. proportion of service produced by customer vs. proportion produced by the 
company. This rate strongly varies according to the service type. 
This leads us to our first hypothesis : 
H1: The participation of the customer is linked to some of his / her individual 
characteristics. 
Co-production, uncertainty and opportunism. 
A consequence of customer participation in the service is that it is a major source of 
uncertainty. This participation actually is far less controllable by the firm than the one of its 
employees. So the more actively the customer participates in the creation of the service, the 
greater the uncertainty linked to his participation. 
Although uncertainty can be defined in many different ways,  literature highlights 
information as one of  its most important  characteristics  (Argote, 1982 : 420;  Larsson & 
Bowen, 1989 : 216). Galbraith wrote that uncertainty is “the difference between the amount of 
information required to perform the task and the amount of information already possessed by 
the organization” (Galbraith, 1973: 5). Argote then operationalizes the concept at the interface 
client / service organization level, within the framework of medical emergency services. She 
notes that “input uncertainty stems from the external environment with which the various units 
are in continuous contact, yet it has an immediate impact on the tasks that the units perform” 
(Argote, 1982: 422). Transposed onto our research, this means that tasks accomplished by 
salespeople working on distribution channels, be they considered independently or gathered 
inside a distribution network are linked to customers’ actions to co-produce the service. This 
uncertainty is usually measured in terms  of  variety of customers demand,  and degree of 
willingness to participate in the service (Larsson & Bowen, 1989). Among these actions, is 
also the transmission of information from the customer to the company. For example, this 
information may be about  the customer personal  situation  (age, revenues,  matrimonial 
situation…), his expectations about the service… 
Yet transmission of this information may be against the customer’s interest. In this 
case,  it would lead to a situation characterized  by uncertainty,  due to an asymmetry of Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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information. For example, to get a loan, a customer may prefer not to tell the truth to the 
adviser, e.g. about the level of his debts ; or a customer who wants to insure his car may lie 
about the number of his previous accidents., So, in other terms, customers may adopt an 
opportunistic behavior, as defined by Williamson (1985): “self-interest seeking with guile. 
This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and 
cheating. Opportunism more often involves subtle forms of deceit” (: 47). 
What we mean is not that all the customers will display opportunism. In fact, we just 
want to insist on the risk of opportunism, that has to be taken into account by a service firm 
when developing new distribution channels. In effect, some customers may be tempted to use 
the multiplication of distribution channels to get from one channel something that may have 
been refused by another. Let us use an example to support what we’re suggesting. A customer 
calls the call-centre of a hotel chain, in order to reserve a room for two nights. A this very 
moment, he tries to get a 20% discount, but this rebate is refused by the tele-operator. So the 
customer makes a full-price reservation. But when he arrives at the hotel, he claims that this 
20% discount had been agreed upon when he reserved the room, and refuses to pay full price. 
What can (or must) the receptionist do ? Imagine the company has implemented a quality and 
satisfaction program. If the customer had really negotiated this discount, then his satisfaction 
will be lower if he finally does not get it, meaning there is a risk for the company to lose the 
customer. So in the end, the receptionist may believe the customer, think that there really was 
a problem during the reservation process, and finally grant him his discount. 
So our second hypothesis is : 
H2 : The development of new distribution channels favours potential customer 
opportunism. 
Following this second hypothesis, we want to insist on the fact that this opportunism is 
but mainly potential, and not  necessarily  effective. This point is  noticed by  Williamson 
(1985):  “I do not insist that every individual is continuously or even largely given to 
opportunism. To the contrary, I merely assume that some individuals are opportunistic some 
of the time and that differential trustworthiness is rarely transparent ex ante” (: 64). 
The coordination of distribution channels. 
We are in a situation of cooperation between the customer and the service firm to 
produce the service, and we postulate that, during this cooperation, some customers may be 
opportunist. According to Williamson (1985), “those who would have cooperative succeed 
must, of necessity, make organizational concessions to the debilitating effects of opportunism. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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Viable cooperatives will attempt to screen against, socially recondition, and otherwise 
penalize opportunistic invaders” (: 65). This does explain the need for companies to set up 
organizational safeguards, protecting them from both opportunism and the resulting 
uncertainty. 
Moreover, the introduction of new interfaces between the customer and the firm, as a 
supplement to an existing distribution channel (e.g. Internet and call-centres in addition to a 
pre-existing  retail outlet  network)  might create  interdependencies between  these entities, 
depending on the strategy of the firm (Gulati & Garino, 2000). Here we consider the case 
when these channels are indeed interdependent, as in retail banking, the insurance or travel 
industry for example. So these interdependences have to be managed, which relates back to 
the definition of coordination, since it is “the management of dependences between activities” 
(Malone & Crowston, 1994;  Crowston, 1997),  which  occur  when “ actions taken by one 
referent system affect the actions or outcomes of another referent system” (Mc Cann & Ferry, 
1979). So managing these interdependences means implementing coordination mechanisms 
between these channels. These coordination mechanisms can  also  be seen  as  the 
organizational safeguards previously  mentioned, needed to counter the negative effects of 
potential opportunism. 
Which coordination mechanisms ? 
March and Simon (1958) have first proposed two coordination modes: by plan and by 
feedback ( :  160-161).  Coordination by plan  is “ coordination based on pre-established 
schedules”, a schedule being defined as “a plan, establish in advance, that determines what 
tasks will be handled and when” (op.cit.). Among them are rules, organizational procedures, 
plans, information and communication standardized systems,… But not everything can be 
anticipated in the schedule. In this case, there is a need for a “coordination that involves 
transmission of new information coordination”, labelled coordination by feedback” (op.cit.).  
Based on this typology, Thompson (1967) identified three coordination mechanisms in 
a firm. The first one is standardization, which “involves the establishment of routines or rules 
which constrain action of each unit or position into paths consistent with those taken by 
others in the interdependent relationship” (: 56). Standardization “requires that the situations 
to which they apply be relatively stable, repetitive, and few enough to permit matching of 
situations with appropriate rules” (op.cit.). The second coordination mechanism identified by 
Thompson  is  coordination by  plan, that “ involves the establishment of schedules for the 
interdependent  units by which their actions may t hen be governed”, and that “ is more Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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appropriate for more dynamic  situations [than standardization]”  (op.cit.).  The last one is 
coordination by mutual  adjustment,  and it “ involves the transmission of new information 
during the process of action” (op.cit.). Even though it seems close to March and Simon’s 
coordination by feedback, Thompson notes that in Simon and March typology, “the term 
“feedback” has gathered a connotation of super / subordination”, even though “coordination 
by mutual adjustment may involve communication across hierarchical lines, but it cannot be 
assumed that it necessarily does” (: 56). 
Finally, based on these works, Mintzberg (1979; 1980) proposed a typology of five 
coordination mechanisms:  direct supervision;  standardization of work processes; 
standardization of outputs; standardization of skills; mutual adjustment. 
Intra-organizational coordination : a contingency perspective. 
These studies, as well as many others that followed (Van de Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 
1976;  Malone & Crowston, 1994; Crowston, 1997; Adler, 1995, etc…) belong to a 
contingency perspective of coordination. The aim of this perspective is to identify the best 
structural structure for an organization confronted with specific conditions (Mintzberg, 1979). 
For example,  March & Simon (op.cit.)  link the stability and predictability of the 
situation a task takes place into with the two kinds of coordination previously presented. For 
these authors, “The more stable and predictable the situation, the greater the reliance on 
coordination by plan; the more variable and unpredictable the situation, the greater the 
reliance on coordination by feedback” (: 161). 
Then,  Thompson  suggests that three types  of interdependence can be identified 
between  an organization’s units: pooled, sequential and reciprocal  interdependence 
(Thompson, 1967: 54). For each interdependence, there is an appropriate type of coordination 
: pooled interdependence is best coordinated by standardization ; sequential interdependences 
are best coordinated by plans; and finally, reciprocal interdependence requires coordination 
by mutual adjustment (: 56). 
Within this contingency perspective, other scholars studied the impact of environment 
on the choice of the organization structure. Such was the aim of Lawrence & Lorsch, who 
showed that the more instable and complex an environment, the more mutual adjustment is 
resorted to, whereas the more stable and certain the environment, the more direct supervision 
and standardization are resorted to (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
As far as we are concerned,  we will  focus on the environment  of a distribution 
channel, which will voluntarily be reduced to the customers interacting with a distribution Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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channel. Whereas he is a co-producer of the service, the customer also acts, in a certain way, 
as a  “screen”,  or  a  “filter”  between  two  distribution channels, because of his potential 
opportunism (as in the room reservation example we used earlier). So, in a way, what we 
propose here is a contingency bound up with the role of the customer as a co-producer of the 
service (and more exactly with the customer potentially being opportunistic). 
Customer opportunism and its impacts on intra-organizational 
coordination. 
We mentioned earlier that, in a theoretical perspective, the more  potentially 
opportunistic the behavior of the customer, the more organizational safeguards the firm will 
have to set up (Williamson, 1985: 48). More particularly, these organizational safeguards may 
be coordination mechanisms that would enable salespeople working on different distribution 
channels, on the one hand to discover an opportunistic behavior, and on the other hand, to 
manage it and prevent its negative consequences for the company. Consequently, it is highly 
probable that these coordination mechanisms will essentially be formal (close to coordination 
by plans, as defined by Simon and March), e.g. a common information system with all the 
transactions the customer  made, whatever the channel he  has used. In addition to this 
information system, would be organizational procedures salespeople would have to follow in 
case of identified or suspected opportunism from the customer. 
So these last theoretical developments lead us to our third hypothesis : 
H3: To limit the customer potentially opportunistic behaviour and its negative 
consequences on the service firm,  the  company would rather  set up formal than 
informal coordination mechanisms. 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH. 
Presentation. 
We decided to study  the  retail  banking sector,  that has undergone  a  lot of 
transformations over the last few years, due to the development of these new distribution 
channels. Actually, the emergence of new channels such as the Internet, most sophisticated 
call-centres, mobile services,… is profoundly changing the French banking industry (and to a 
larger extent, the world banking industry), making it most interesting to study. Although the 
branch  was the historical  point of contact between a bank and its customers,  nowadays 
customers can  access  many  banking products and services through the aforementioned 
channels, such as bank transfers, checking accounts consultation, or even to take out a loan, 
for example. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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Our data, coming from a broader research on innovation in services distribution 
channels,  were collected in a French regional retail  bank (that is part of a national one) 
between  August and December 2001.  Its customers  are  small and medium companies, 
professions and craftsmen, and private individuals. According to the theories we previously 
resorted to, we naturally focused on the last ones. 
According to its marketing director,  this  bank can be qualified as  “an effective 
follower” concerning new distribution channels. Although many of its French competitors had 
initialized the implementation of new distribution channels 2 or 3 years before, this bank has 
set its outgoing call-centre in 1998, its incoming call-centre in 2000; an earlier version of its 
Internet website had been launched around 1998, and it had been improved by the time of our 
study, but its traffic was still limited by then (this was supposed to quickly evolve thanks to a 
large advertising campaign  launched during  our study);  and, finally, the bank also offers 
interactive television services, the use of which is very marginal. Therefore our study 
essentially focused on the interactions between  what were then  the 3 main distribution 
channels, i.e. branches, the outgoing call-centre and the incoming call-centre. 
Salespeople working on the outgoing call-centre have to call either clients of the bank 
or prospective buyers, in order to sell them basic products or services (e.g. credit cards, or to 
convince the customers to  increase  the amount of their savings accounts),  or  to get 
appointments for branch advisers. This latter mission is possible because branch advisers have 
an electronic timetable shared with the two call-centres. 
The incoming call-center is called by the customers using a taxed phone number. It is 
supposed  to relieve branch advisers of basic demand from the customers, but very time 
consuming and not value adding (fund transfers, checkbooks orders, purchases and sales on 
the Stock Exchange,…). Salespeople working on this incoming call-centre may also make 
appointments on behalf of branch advisers if they detect a potential sale during the discussion 
with the customer (since they too have an access to branch advisers timetable). 
So both call-centres were supposed,  according to the area manager, to be 
complementary to the branches network, and not to replace it, but this is not an easy thing to 
achieve:  “The problem is to  make sure that these interfaces  considered as a whole  are 
complementary, and that they do not cannibalize each other”. This is all the more important 
that branch advisers (one of them being quoted thereafter) are afraid of being cannibalized 
and to lose a part of their job: “The branch adviser fears to be dispossessed, I would say, not 
of a part of his power, but of a part of his job, you know”. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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Methodology. 
In order to understand these interactions, and following the methodology Yin (1994) 
proposes, data were collected on a case study basis, that seemed to fit particularly well to the 
object  of the study, since it is  “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994: 13). This really is a characteristic feature of 
this research, since  new channels development is  particularly  recent,  and  since  this 
phenomenon and its context are tangled. 
Given that our research dealt with the interface level between a service firm and its 
customers, we focused on front office employees working in branches and in the two call-
centers. Indeed, it seemed obvious that they could really identify a potentially opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of their clients. So  25 in-depth, semi-structured  interviews  were 
conducted, divided as follows : 11 private individual branch advisers working in four different 
branches,  plus the  four branch managers (the choice of the  branches  had been made  in 
agreement with the bank sales manager); 3 salespeople working on the incoming call-centrer 
(i.e. about one-third of the call-centre workforce); 3 salespeople working on the outgoing call-
centre (i.e. about half of the workforce of this call-centre); the area manager (whom we met 
twice); the call-centre manager; and finally, the marketing director. 
Moreover, with a view to triangulation,  we  got many internal communication 
documents dating from 1998 and 2000, corresponding to the creation of each call-centre. 
Among these were written notes and  documents, and more importantly  two videotapes 
especially realized for each call-centre. All of these internal communication materials were 
spread within the branches network so as to explain to branch advisers the goals of these two 
call-centres. The main message the top management of the bank wanted them to understand 
was that the call-centres were created in order to help them in their daily work, and, as we’ve 
already mentioned, to relieve them of basic demands from the customers.  
All these data were collected between August and December 2001. Each interview 
was recorded, in agreement with the interviewee (this was easy once they were told that the 
tapes were not to be given to their manager, and that the interview was totally anonymous), 
then fully transcribed, and a content analysis was made. A two-pages report was sent to each 
interviewee within the two or three weeks following the interview, so that they validate what 
had been said, and eventually add complementary information. Finally, the results of the 
study were presented first to the area manager in March 2002, and then to the marketing 
director in April 2002. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION. 
Here we are going to present and discuss the results of the study. First, we will verify 
the validity  of our hypotheses. Then, we will also present a result that emerge from the 
analysis of the interviews, and that was not anticipated on the basis of our literature survey.  
Hypothesis 1. 
At first, we shall specify the role size of the customers, since this can be considered as 
a contingent data. In our study, the customer role size is important, since they have to change 
their habits, at least agree to speak about money on the phone, with someone who is not their 
own branch adviser. It is not that obvious for the customers of this bank, as we’ll see later 
when considering the customer’s profile. 
The organizational context in branches of this bank must be stated: three different 
salespeople serve different kinds of customers. At first, there are patrimonial advisers, who 
are generally older than their colleagues, and usually spent a long time (up to 30 years) in the 
banking sector or even in this bank. They serve wealthier customers, who are interested by a 
large range of financial products, and are generally older than the average. Then, there are two 
levels in the “clientele advisers” (as named by the bank) hierarchy in this bank. On the first 
level are advisers who have either young (less than 25 or 30) or not very wealthy customers. 
These advisers are younger (less than 30), medium academic degree, and don’t often have the 
opportunity to sell sophisticated products. It’s a first step for most of them. The second level 
is mostly composed of advisers coming from the first level, or who have a higher academic 
degree. Their customers are well-off, but not wealthy, and most of them are between 25 and 
50. Finally, one can also specify the case of branch managers’ customers, who are directors of 
small or medium firms, regarding their enterprise and their personal accounts. But of course, 
each branch manager has very few customers,  since they also have to coordinate, train, 
boost… their teams.  This frame being given, we expected customer segmentation versus 
customer participation, emerge from interviews, and 3 criterion arise from the talks. 
The first criterion we identified is  the age of the customer. The advisers perceive 
differences in new channels use according t o the age of customers. Older people have 
difficulties regarding the change: “I have many old customers…. to require them to use the 
phone, that’s not really obvious”. But advisers feel future younger customers will change the 
trend, since they are demanding for new technologies:  “new accounts are due to young 
people, most of them, and young people, if you cannot offer them powerful and developed 
channels of distribution, they will leave”. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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The second criterion which stems from interviews is life style: it seems to be a less 
powerful criterion, since the older people are more concerned by this segmentation criterion. 
“my customers are rather traditional, therefore they have many difficulties  [with new 
channels], except the young people”. T h is bank has many b ranches in rural zones, and 
medium-sized cities, and advisers link that specific profile with their customers’ reluctance to 
use new distribution channels.  
The third emerging criterion is call frequency. This criterion is linked to emotional and 
reactions: customers going to or calling daily their branch adviser do not want to change: “I 
call them ‘my old women’, it’s affectionate, they won’t change”. On the contrary, people 
coming or calling occasionally, only to get information, are more willing to use new channels. 
“occasional ones [customers], yes, they call me less. Therefore that [the incoming call-centre] 
is positive”. 
So, in this context of high customer participation, age seems to be the main criterion of 
willingness, and then life style for older people; moreover a psychological criterion, closely 
related to interaction frequency has emerged. Of course, these three criterion could really be 
validated with a larger, quantitative study. 
Another conclusion can be draw from the interviews: it seemed clear to us that ability 
and willingness were linked. In fact, we weren’t able to clearly identify the share of customers 
lack of capability from their lack of willingness in adviser’s answers. That link is still to be 
clarified. 
Hypothesis 2: The development of new distribution channels favours potential 
customer opportunism. 
The problem was to verify whether the potential opportunistic  behaviour of the 
customer was actually displayed.  In fact, the interviews showed that this potential 
opportunism was not really felt by branch advisers. On the other hand, salespeople working 
on the two call-centres  did feel  this opportunism  from  the customers. More exactly,  we 
identified two forms of opportunism related to the two different call-centres. 
The first one can be qualified as an active and premeditated opportunism: in this case, 
clients voluntarily contact the incoming call-centre, in order to obtain what was refused by 
their branch agent. Such is the case with this quotation coming from an interview with a 
saleswoman of the incoming call-centre, who was speaking of a customer who was asking for 
a loan, refused by his branch adviser. 
“Customers try and take advantage of the call-centre, thinking:» my branch adviser 
refused, well, I am going to call someone else, who will accept»”. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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In this case, the customer’s willingness to deceive the bank is obvious, in order to 
satisfy his personal interest. In other words, he reveals an opportunistic behaviour that was 
premeditated, since it is he who decided to call the call-centre. 
The second form of opportunism changes in its modalities. That is due to the fact that 
it relates to the outgoing call-centre. In fact, the nature of the opportunism changes because it 
is the bank who calls the customer, meaning that the initiative of the contact does not belong 
to the customer. According to a tele-operator
1 working there: 
“If their branch adviser told them [the customers] “no”, they are going to search the 
same information elsewhere. So, when we call them, they are trying to get it from us”. 
Contrary to the first  kind of opportunism, which we qualified as active and 
premeditated, here we have what we called spontaneous, or incident opportunism. 
So the potential opportunism we had theoretically proposed is actually displayed by 
some customers, even though  it is a  minority of them.  So we can say that the second 
hypothesis is but partially validated. 
Hypothesis 3 : To limit the customer potentially opportunistic behaviour and its 
negative consequences on the service firm, the company would rather set up 
formal coordination than informal coordination mechanisms. 
Thanks to our different sources, we have identified many coordination mechanisms, 
which we decided to sort according to Mintzberg’s (1979) typology, certainly one of the most 
known.  The entire typology could not be  reconstituted, but the following  coordination 
mechanisms have been found. 
1.  Standardization of work processes: 3 coordination mechanisms. 
The first coordination mechanism we identified is a shared electronic customer file: 
whatever the channel they are working on, all salespeople have the same computerized access 
to customer information, shared between branches and the two call-centres. Tele-operators 
working on the outgoing call-centre only use the phone number of the customer to call him, 
but do not use the other information at their disposal: “yes, we can access the customer’s file, 
but it is not an objective”, confirmed  one of the tele-operators we interviewed.  On the 
contrary, the incoming call-centre does use these files. That means that branch advisers, event 
though they do know their customers, have to bring the files up to date, so that tele-advisers of 
the incoming call-centre can use the same information. Branch advisers are conscious that 
frequent updates are most important : “I try and update these files at least once a week. That 
is the most difficult. It is to hold on this delay. To fill in the files. But I know how imperative it 
is”. (branch adviser). However, not all branch advisers respect this procedure, and this is a big Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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problem for the bank, since the customer’s file is supposed to become crucial to coordinate all 
the channels. In effect, if a customer who tries to be opportunist notes that call-centres and 
branches have the same information, he will be less tempted to be opportunist again. Indeed, 
opportunistic behavior is  already  limited thanks  to this shared file, as noticed by a tele-
operator: “  It [opportunism attempts from the customers]  does not  work because the 
information system is such that, anyway, we identify the kind of customer we have to deal with 
very quickly”. 
The second coordination mechanism is the use of internal electronic mail, from call-
centres to branches. It is a procedural form of coordination, since messages are pre-formatted, 
and little space is left for personal remarks. It is very restrictive, as confirmed by many of the 
tele-operators: “All the messages are pre-recorded, so it goes very fast” ; “We have a limited 
number of characters, so we just write in the message subject “seen for such thing, I contact 
the branch adviser””. Branch advisers receive all these information via this internal e-mail, 
but they scarcely use it. 
Finally, the third procedural coordination mechanism strictly concerns the outgoing 
call-centre. It can be summarized as: many tele-operators, but one name only. When they call 
a customer, tele-operators always present themselves using the same n ame (for example, 
Jacques Dupont or Marie Dupont). So, when a customer calls back his branch adviser to talk 
to him about a service or a product he had been offered, the branch adviser immediately 
knows who called his client (i.e. the outgoing call-centre). Complementary to this procedure, 
branch advisers are informed about sales campaigns under progress at the call-centre. 
2.  Standardization of skills: 2 coordination mechanisms. 
First one here is that both branch advisers and salespeople working on the incoming 
call-centre have the same training. In fact, most of the salespeople of this call-centre come 
from the branch network (5 out of 6), where they worked for many years. This does promote 
this call-centre, that is seen as very professional by branch advisers (compared to the outgoing 
call-centre, where young people with little, if any, experience work). This was confirmed by 
this branch manager: “The incoming call-centre, I really consider the advisers as branch 
adviser, they have the same profile, people who work there have experience, they are not new 
to the trade”. The problem is, that even though the top management of the bank heavily 
communicated on this subject, it was not fully assimilated by everybody. At least, this is how 
an adviser of this call-centre appreciates the point of view of branch advisers who come to 
visit it: “Generally, they [branch advisers] arrive with negative a priori assumptions, because, 
even though there was a lot of communication, they are not always conscious that we come Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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from the branches network, so they are amazed when they see the quality of the advisers who 
work here”.  
Distinct roles,  distinct competences :  this  second mechanism is very important to 
coordinate the channels. In case of uncertainty, for example, when a tele-operator faces a 
problem with a customer, he sends him back towards his branch adviser, who alone has the 
right to decide. So, if a tele-adviser ever suspects opportunism from a client, he can easily 
counter it by explaining the customer that only the branch adviser has the power to decide 
what to do: “We are here to inform, to get appointments, we are not here to take somebody’s 
side between a customer and his branch adviser” (outgoing call-centre operator); “We make 
enquiries about the situation, and we say to the customer  “you are  strongly induced to 
contact your branch adviser”” (incoming call-centre operator). 
3.  Direct supervision. 
Top managers got strongly involved during the launching period of the two call-
centres, organizing information and formation programs. In one of the two videotapes, we 
saw the general manager of the bank explaining to branch salespeople  the strategic 
importance of cooperation between everyone in the bank, whatever the kind of distribution 
channel they work on. 
Moreover, in the everyday work of branch advisers, we could find some coordination 
mechanisms  related to direct supervision. The first of them, and apparently the most 
important, is the sales target. We can quote here what two branch advisers told us, among 
many others: “But there is an easy way to push us: sales targets”; “And I tell you that, having 
targets with bonuses at stake is most incentive”. Then is a continuous heavy communication 
around the new distribution channels topic and their promotion to customers. For example, 
weekly branch meetings are an opportunity for the branch manager to often tackle the subject 
: “We regularly speak about this topic during the weekly meeting”. 
4.  Mutual adjustment. 
We found but one marginal example of mutual adjustment in our sample, in the sense 
of Mintzberg (1979). One tele-operator working on the incoming call-centre told us about 
what can be called mutual adjustment via a phone call: “Well, this morning, for example, I 
had the customer on the phone, and I took the liberty of calling a branch, asking the branch 
adviser whether she agrees with me selling this product to the client. I told her that it usually 
was she who had to do this, but I asked her whether she wanted me to “push the button”, she 
told me “yes”, so I did it”. Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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In fact, mutual adjustment implies a minimum of informal contact, that the bank’s top-
management seems not to encourage between salespeople working on different distribution 
channels. For example, visits of the call-centre are usually previewed during a break in a 
training session, where the call-centres have been set up. However, this absence of informal 
contact seems to be badly felt. “What we miss today, and will perhaps be there tomorrow, are 
meetings with the ones and the others”, told us a branch adviser. According to her, they would 
ensure a better understanding of the call-centres procedures by branch advisers, who would 
certainly better understand the importance of the update of the customer’s file.  
 
Everything that precedes  about these coordination mechanisms  leads us  to the 
following analysis: formal coordination mechanisms seem to be favoured  over  informal 
mechanisms. More exactly, we should say that formal coordination mechanisms are all the 
more used as distribution channels are more interdependent. This result goes against the one 
found by Van  de Ven, Delbecq et alii. (1976), who showed that the amount of 
interdependence  was positively associated with the use of rather informal coordination 
mechanisms, whereas it was negatively related to the use of formal mechanisms such as rules, 
plans or vertical communication channels. 
We propose two different, but complementary, interpretations that may explain this 
finding. The first one is that bank managers had implemented formal coordination to prevent 
potential customer opportunism from happening and negatively impacting on the bank. The 
second one is that, to manage the complexity of a new multi-channel system, it is better and 
easier, and perhaps less costly (it is to be verified with further studies) to rest on formal 
coordination mechanisms.  In effect, let us imagine if, in a B - to-C context (involving, 
particularly in the case of retail banking, thousands of contacts a day), each time a tele-
operator suspects opportunism, he calls the branch adviser to get an information. Financial, 
time costs would be huge, without integrating the loss of trust and confidence that is most 
important in the relationship between a customer and her bank (the customer may think: “they 
do not trust me, they believe I do not tell the truth, I decide to break the relationship”…) 
Result 4: the customer acts as a “perception filter” between employees of the 
different channels. 
As we were collecting and analyzing our data, a fourth result emerge from our field of 
research. To explain it, we will first remember that, in the services literature, the customer is 
generally considered as co-producer (Chase, 1978; Bitner et al., 1997), and even as “partial 
employee” (Mills and Morris, 1986) of the firm. Moreover, in the banking sector, customers Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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are members exchanging information with the firm in a continuous service relationship 
(Lovelock 1983). In this context, the customer has a really active role (Larsson and Bowen, 
1989). Our study highlights a consequence of this role: the customer has an impact on the 
branch adviser’s degree of acceptance of the organisational innovation represented by the 
introduction of call-centres. 
Customers having negative experiences with the incoming call-centre are reported to 
quickly inform their branch adviser. The latter tends to negatively re-examine their judgement 
about the call-centre, and then develops a stronger resistance to present the new channels to 
other customers. “ my first reaction was positive...   Before hearing customers feedback [... ] 
Some customers were called for sophisticated products [... ] I had negative feedbacks and 
problems with my customers following these calls”. Thereby, the customer modifies branch 
salespeople perception about their colleagues working in the call centre. 
As far as the outgoing call-centre is concerned, the branch adviser perception is linked 
with the number and quality of new customers acquired through the call-centre. When branch 
salespeople lose time on low potential customers, they are reluctant about the outgoing call-
centre, though they sometimes recognize it can bring them interesting prospects, they would 
have no time to canvass. 
This increased customer role, as a “mediator” or “ perception filter” between two 
types of salespeople in the same firm is a new problem for the company: since the customers 
are more inclined to complain, than to announce their satisfaction (Zeithaml and Bitner, 
2002),  branch  advisers have more negative than positive  feedbacks  from their customers 
about the call-centres.  
As a management consequence, the bank should induce customers to inform branch 
advisers when they are satisfied with one or the other call-centre, for instance by having 
branch adviser ask directly the customers’ opinions or indirectly by satisfaction studies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Most studies on distribution channels coordination focus on  inter-organisational 
coordination, based for example on Stern, El-Ansary & Coughlan (1996) definition of 
distribution channels.  But there is a real lack of  research  about the multiplication of 
distribution channels considered as the interface between a service firm and its customers, i.e. 
a great lack of research i n a  multichannel context, that does  raise  intra-organizational 
coordination problems. This is what we tried to study in this paper, through a research that, Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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consequently, can be considered as exploratory. We hope to have contributed to this field of 
research in some ways, despite the limits of our study. 
As  advisers (be they  working on branches or call-centres) represent  the  interface 
between the bank and its customers, we chose to centre our analysis around them, in order to 
understand their perception of the customer as a creative actor of the service (Larsson and 
Bowen, 1989), as well as their perception of the impact of new distribution channels on their 
relationship with their customers. In this context, the main results, and proposal for future 
research are the following. 
First,  the advisers’ perceptions of their clients allowed us to  give rise to  three 
segmentation criteria that seemed to have an impact on customer participation. The three 
criteria were the age, lifestyle and call frequency of the customer. Moreover, we were able to 
propose  a dependent relationship between  customer ability and customer willingness to 
participate in the service, that are two of the three determinants of customer participation in a 
service ( Risch Rodie  & Schultz Kleine, 2 000). As a result,  future research  may try and 
confirm this relationship between customer ability and customer willingness, and explore the 
impact of the individual customer characteristics on his / her participation in the service. 
Secondly, we showed that because of his / her potentially opportunistic behavior, the 
customer plays a more and more active and direct role on intra-organizational coordination 
within a service firm. In fact, we showed that the customer has a mediating impact on the 
social relationships between branch advisers and tele-operators. This is why we qualified the 
customer as a “perception filter”.  This new role of the customer,  directly linked to  the 
multiplication of new distribution channels,  goes  with an increase  in formal coordination 
mechanisms within the organization.  These mechanisms  not only  enables the bank’s top 
management to counter potential customer opportunism, but also contributes to develop 
internal coherence, to ensure the customer the best quality of service by offering the same 
information in all distribution channels. This can be a complementary explanation to the 
choice of formal coordination mechanisms by this bank. However, future research may dig 
further so as to discover other consequences of the role the customer plays between front 
office salespeople working on different channels. 
Finally, one main limit to our research relates to the generalization of our results: at 
first, we studied a regional retail bank through a case study, i.e. a specific context, with a 
limited number of interviews and it has still to be verified that one can generalize to other 
types of banks, such as big national or international ones. Secondly, the sector is also specific, 
and generalization to other sectors must take these specificities into account : in the banking Proceedings of The AMA SERVSIG Services Research Conference, Reims Management School, Reims, 13-15 
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sector, branch advisers sell new channels as complementary services to their customers. The 
context is similar in insurance, but not necessarily in tourist industry, where travel agencies 
and new channels are mostly competitors. 
Another limit is linked to the exploratory conditions of our study. Qualitative results 
are a first step, but they need to be confirmed (or not) by further researches, specifically 
quantitative validation on advisers and customers. 
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1 Thereafter, both “tele-operator” and “tele-adviser” will be used indistinctly. 